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(AppeHant) with trespass. Appellant 2008, 
second trespass was filed and charges against 
Appellant were dismissed by the prosecutor. In the third instance, the matter was resolved July 
of2013 when Appellant was acquitted of the charge following a bench trial. Following the 
acquittal, Appellant filed this lawsuit naming the Respondents and alleging various § 1983 and 
state law tort claims. District Court granted summary judgment dismissing all of Appellants 
claims on December 31, 2015. 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
Appellant filed her prose Complaint on September 16, 201 Respondents filed a motion 
to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-610 on October 23, 2015. § 6-610 motion was heard 
on November 16, 2015. The District Court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss pursuant to§ 
6-610 on November 20, 2015. Respondent's filed a motion for summary judgment on November 
12, 2015. A hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment on December 9, 2015. 
District Court granted Respondents' motion for summary judgment and dismissed Appellant's 
Complaint with prejudice on December 31, 2015. Judgment dismissal was entered by the 
District Court on January 13, 2016. Appellant timely filed this appeal on February 4, 2016. 
l 
during all 
to matter. was 
during all times relevant to this matter. Respondent John Clements was a deputy for the Sheriffs 
Office at all times relevant to this matter. Robin was the elected prosecuting attorney 
and Amelia Sheets was deputy prosecutor during all times relevant to 
matter. 
3. Appellant filed lawsuit on September 16,201 (Complaint, pg. 
matter from three trespass charges 
occurred 2008, and Appellant pled guilty. (R. 707) The second trespass charge was filed in 
2009, and was later dismissed by the prosecutor. (R. 707) The third trespass charge was issued 
on August 30, 2011. (R. 707) Appellant was acquitted trespass on July 13. 
(R. 707). 
4. Appellant recounted that on July 24, 2011 she received a call from Bill Shurtliff (a 
County) indicating that there were located on property 
Murdock and Kurt B. Young that were in poor condition. Mr. Shurtliff asked Appellant to go out 
and look at them. 
2 
I 
6. ""1" "'',.. that was 
was taking pictures of the Id. Appellant said that 
was on was not a lot "Id. 
Young called in a trespass complaint to the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office against Appellant 
being on his property without permission. This was the second time during the year that Mr. 
had Jefferson County Sheriffs Office and entered a about Appellant 
trespassing on his property. (R. 489; Dep. Elliott, 4). Mr. Young had a trespass 
against Appellant on April 20, 2011. 481 · Dep. Elliott, 1 10). 
7. approximately same time, Appellant called in a complaint animal 
against Mr. Young and Murdoch. Deputy John Clements was assigned to respond to 
complaints. Deputy Clements first responded to Mr. Young's residence. a standard 
investigation. spoke with Young, Murdoch and other witnesses including Klurissa 
Young. He had the witnesses fill out witness statements. He went to Mr. Murdock's property and 
investigated the animal abuse complaint. He took photographs of the horses and of the property. 
Young, 
the photographs demonstrated that Appellant had been trespassing on his ground. Mr. Young 
then signed a citizen "trespass" complaint against Appellant. (R. 4 76; Dep. Elliott, 69-71 ). 
a camera 
car 1s on 
9. and spoke with Appellant and 
husband regarding 
Appellant of the incident. (R. 476; Dep. Elliott, 71:9-10) 
10. After Deputy Clements gathered the information regarding the two complaints 
lodged with the Sheriff's on 
Jefferson County Prosecutor's office. (R. 
2011, he turned all of the ,n+,,.,.,.,,,,"',v"',+>u~·u over to the 
Aff Clements, ,r 5) 
11. The elected prosecutor for County at the was Robin Dunn. 
Dunn assigned his deputy Amelia Sheets to handle the incidents. (R. 459; AjJ. Sheets, ,r 
480; Dep. Elliott, 91 :9-13) Mr. Dunn has explained that he assigned Ms. Sheets to handle the 
case, that he was not personally involved in the day-to-day prosecution of case. Ms. 
Sheets made the charging decision without any input or influence from Mr. Dunn 
explained that he did not hold any malice or ill-will toward the Appellant. (R. 440; Aff Dunn, ,i 
1-5) 
determined that there was probable cause to issue a citation for trespass against Appellant. The 
probable cause arose from the fact that Appellant had trespassed on Mr. Young's property earlier 
in the year, and had returned to Mr. Young's property on July 2011. Specifically, Ms. Sheets 
4 
that not act 
13. The decision to charge Appellant was an exercise of Ms. Sheets' judgment 
in the course of carrying out duties as a deputy prosecutor Jefferson 
was not influenced by any 
charging decision. (R. 459; Ajf Sheets, ~ 6) 
While Dunn not case, 
It is his professional 
probable cause to a citation for trespass against 
statements, photographs and particularly 
admission of Mr. Young that Appellant was "on his property. (R. Ajf Dunn, ,r 5) 
15. Deputy Clements has testified that he did not hold any malice or ill-will toward 
Appellant. He has explained that he did not act with deliberate indifference to any Appellant's 
constitutional rights. He has explained that he resn011ae:a to the trespass call according to his 
training, he investigated the facts, gathered evidence, and submitted the facts to the Prosecuting 
office. (R. 462; Aff. Clements, ,r 4-6) 
5 
7. 
1, to his 0,~ .. ~"'"b all'"'""""'"'"' 1-'~••v»,~ 
were followed County Sheriffs and Deputy Clements. Sheriff 
was to 
handling of a trespass calL Sheriff Olsen explained that the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office did 
not have any policy that authorized or allowed malicious prosecution. There was no formal 
policy or informal practice of authorizing or allowing a deputy to exert improper 
a charging decision. (R. 436; A.ff Olsen, ,r 3-5). 
18. Sheriff Olsen did not hold any personal ill 
over 
against Appellant AH charging decisions in regard to the August 30, 2011 
were made by Prosecuting Attorney's Office. (R. 436; A.ff Olsen, ,r 6). 
complaint 
19. Appellant admitted that she did not have any direct evidence that Sheriff 
acted with "malice" in regard to her. (R. 485; Dep. Elliott, 195:11-14) Appellant also 
acknowledged that she did not have any evidence that Sheriff Olsen had anything to do with the 
decision to issue the criminal charge trespass on August 30, 2011. (R. 485; Dep. Elliott, 
193: 14-16) 
20. Though he is named in the Complaint, Commissioner Gerald Raymond did not 




or some over 
Dep. Elliott, 139: 1-7). 
Commissioner Raymond has explained that he does not have any 
authority over Jefferson County, and that is not in of 
the 
ofthe 
The Sheriff is a separately elected official, and is 
23. 
budget each department or 
of the Sheriffs 
had a statutory obligation to 
budgetary review 
supervisory authority over the day-to-day conduct of the Sheriff or 
Raymond, 1 6) 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 




Appellant has filed this appeal listing seven issues ( a -g) in her opening brief. This Court 
has been unwavering in holding that "[ w ]here an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error 
with particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error 




compliance with the it is deemed to be waived. Id. a final this 
that "[p ]ro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration simply because 
choose to represent themselves, not from 
v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 244 P.3d 197, (201 O); ( citing Sammis v. ~Magnetek, 
342, 941 
standards as 
"pro se litigants are 318 (1997). n.uu,,.,, 
represented by an '-'A"""'~] " (citing 




Based upon the foregoing case law, Appellant has only appropriately identified one 
appeal (whether District Court erred in granting summary judgment on 
malicious prosecution claims). Appellant has not specifically identified any other legal or factual 
issue on appeal and has not argued in her brief for reversal of any other factual or legal issue on 
appeal. is not to the on appeal error." For example, even 
though Appellant has attempted to appeal the District Court's grant of summary judgment, she 
has not identified which, if any, of the legal rulings in the Order granting summary judgment 
she intends to appeal. general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district 
8 
DISTRICT COURT 
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM. 
it is to specific issue on appeal, 
prosecution" in part (b) "Issues Presented Appeal" and has alluded to "multiple 
malicious prosecutions" paragraph one of her "Argument". gravamen the allegations in 
Appellant's 
prosecution claims, the District Court correctly applied law to the facts 
(which were construed a light most favorable to Appellant). Following that analysis, the 
District Court that summary judgment was appropriate on both Appellant's malicious 
prosecution (R. 723) In the "Nature the Case" portion Appellant suggests 
that she "appeals the dismissal on summary judgment in 1983 Civil Rights claim against 
respondents, for their repeated malicious, baseless, and coordinated charges filed against 
Appellant and for the failure of the Respondents {Commissioners) to intercede when informed of 
the actions against her." Appellant's Brief, pg. 12. Respondents view this as the only issue that 
Appellant has appropriately raised on appeal, i.e., the dismissal of her§ 1983 and state law 
malicious prosecution claims against the Respondents. 
probable cause, so 
purpose of denying 
Maricopa Cnty., 693 896,919 
or another specific constitutional right. Lacey v. 
2012)(citing Freeman v. of Santa Ana, 
1180, 1189 (9th Cir.1995). 
In Freeman, the plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to malicious prosecution when 
charges were brought against her and later dropped. The 9th Circuit held that "although she 
alleges that the defendants acted with intent to deprive her of constitutional rights, Freeman is 
unable to show that she was prosecuted without probable cause." Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 
68 F .3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended on denial ofreh'g and reh'g en bane (Dec. 29, 
1995)(citing Brown v. Selfridge, 224 U.S. 189, 192, 32 S.Ct. 444,446, 56 L.Ed. 727 (1912) 
(holding that plaintiff bears the burden of proving malice and lack of probable cause). In 
Freeman, the 9th Circuit dismissed the malicious prosecution claim noting that the plaintiff: 
Id. 
merely lists the series of citations that were issued against her and notes that they 
were dismissed. However, the mere fact a prosecution was unsuccessful does not 
mean it was not supported by probable cause. She does not point to any evidence 
indicating that probable cause was lacking. Thus, even if the defendants acted 
with the purpose of denying Freeman's constitutional rights, the district court did 
not err by directing a verdict on Freeman's malicious prosecution claims. 
The District Court analyzed the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim in conjunction with 
the state law malicious prosecution claim, as the facts supporting each claim were the same. 
IO 
,vas 
want probable cause, and damages were sustained." 85 Idaho 286, 
4 416 (1963). 
with favor by the courts. Id. 
never been regarded 
defense of advice of counsel is equivalent to a showing of 
probable cause, and "generally precludes an action for malicious prosecution." Id. 
Under these state and federal standards the issue whether there was "probable cause" 
the charge is the fundamental analysis. District properly held that Appellant 
because ( as the District Court held) was probable cause trespass 
"'"'"LL"'" issued in 2011. The District Court separately analyzed the malicious prosecution claims 
as they related to conduct each Respondent 
a. The District Court correctly held that the malicious prosecution claims 
should be dismissed as against Deputy Clements. 
With regard to Deputy Clements, the District Court noted that Appellant's primary 
argument in opposition to summary judgment was the contention that Deputy Clements "lied" in 
his probable cause affidavit. District Court compared the probable cause affidavit against 
Plaintiffs summary of Deputy Clements' statements, and against the "lapel audio" submitted by 
opposition to summary judgment. District noted 
1 
nnrunc, were even young to 
that he had photos of Candace, given to 
lapel cam video submitted to Court, it is 
the affidavit contains no false information. Since the only allegation Ul",<UH,:H 
Deputy Clements was that he lied on his Probable Cause Affidavit, and that 
allegation is not backed by any evidence, the Plaintiff has provided no evidence 
that Deputy Clements acted outside his discretion or that he provided false 
information to the County Prosecutors. 
(R. 717) The District Court was not able to find any issue of fact created by Appellant that 
Deputy Clements "lied" in his probable cause affidavit. On appeal, Appellant has not offered any 
further argument reversal of the District Court's decision regard to Deputy Clements. 
The District Court properly found that Appellant had not established a genuine issue 
for trial on elements (4) and (5). The District Court found that "no 
argue that there was lack of probable cause when multiple eye witness statements were 
received and photographs showed the [appellant] was at the place at the time of the event, so that 
opportunity to trespass existed, it is proper for the Court to determine that there was probable 
cause to charge the Plaintiff with the original office." (R. 722) Court noted that "the 
only material fact that was not stipulated to is whether Deputy Clements submitted a false 
probable cause affidavit, and there is no evidence supporting such an allegation." (R. 723) The 
found that "the Plaintiff produced no evidence proving that 
statements were unreliable or that the Jefferson County Prosecutors acted unreasonably by 
relying on them." (Id.) 
12 
liable on a 1 
investigation to prosecuting 
,.,, .. ,_,,,.," a charging 
decision based upon her experience as a prosecuting attorney and based the facts in the 
record. Independent review by a prosecutor precludes a claim of malicious prosecution against a 
police officer. case, the District Court held that "Plaintiff has not provided any evidence 
to that Deputy Clements "falsified his affidavit" cause. (R. 715). 
sum, Appellant did not present level would 
establish that Deputy Clements was actuated by "malice" or that the 2011 trespass charge lacked 
probable cause. Deputy Clements submitted an affidavit at the District Court level verifying that 
he did not act with "malice" toward Plaintiff in regard to the investigation of the 2011 trespass. 
The investigation was completed by Deputy Clements and the facts were presented to the 
Prosecuting Attorney for review. The prosecutor made the decision to charge Appellant with 
trespass. The independent review of the prosecutor demonstrates probable cause for the citation. 
District found that these facts a of malicious 
that the Appellant failed to create a genuine issue of fact for trial on each required element of her 
state law malicious prosecution claim. 
should be dismissed as against prosecutors Robin Dunn and Amelia 
Sheets. 
to Jefferson 
held that they were entitled to prosecutorial immunity from Appellant's claim of malicious 
prosecution. District Court correctly held that to overcome the immunity afforded to 
prosecutors, Appellant had to establish that there was a want of probable cause and that the 
prosecutors acted with "malice". In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 125 209, 
113 s. 2606 (1993), the Court restated the application 
brought against a prosecuting attorney: 
We expressly stated that "the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for 
the state involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and 
actions apart from the courtroom." and are nonetheless entitled to absolute 
immunity. . .. We have not retreated, however, from the principle that acts 
undertaken by a prosecutor in pre-proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the 
course of his role as an advocate for the state, are entitled to the protections of 
absolute immunity. Those acts must include the professional evaluation of the 
evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation 
at trial or before a grand jury after a decision to seek an indictment has been 
made. 
509 U.S. at 272-73 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Absolute immunity applies when a 
prosecutor performs traditional prosecutorial functions connected with hearings, such as drafting 




"include that the Prosecutors had evidence contradicting Deputy Clements' 
probable cause affidavit or witness statements, there is no genuine 




Appellant did not present any evidence at 
was no 
District 
of fact as to whether 




either prosecutor was actuated by "malice" or that the 2011 trespass charge lacked probable 
cause. Dunn and each an affidavit at the 
verifying that he/she did not act with "malice" toward Plaintiff regard to the investigation or 
charging of the 2011 trespass. The investigation was completed by Deputy Clements and the 
were presented to Ms. Sheets Ms. Sheets made to charge Appellant 
with trespass. The District Court properly found that these facts preclude a claim of malicious 
prosecution, and that the Appellant failed to create a genuine issue of fact for trial on each 
required element of her state law malicious prosecution 
15 
argument that made 
agam 
and by of hearsay, that Ms. Sheets admitted to her attorney during a break in the criminal 
trial that she had not viewed the evidence before charging Appellant. See, Appellant's Brief, pg. 
24. 
District Court correctly that Appellant had to establish facts in the to create a 
genume of fact trial against Dunn Sheets. (R. 9) Appellant argues (without 
citation to the record) that was removed from the case by Judge Stephens, is simply 
not true. Appellant argues that was involved in the charging decision (without citation to 
the record), when the evidence before the Court is clear that Dunn assigned Sheets to handle the 
the charging decision. (R. 440; 459-460) 
This Court should affirm the District Court's finding with regard to Respondents Dunn 
and Sheets. 
16 
liability law is clear 
a 
Respondents on a 
and/or supervising 
officials cannot vicariously liable in § I 983 claims. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under Monell, requisite elements a § 1983 claim against a 
municipality ( or entity) are following: ( 1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; 
the municipality entity) had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to 
deliberate indifference to plaintiffs constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the 
moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Dep't of 
Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 111 1 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 
92 831, 835 (9th 1996)(intema1 quotation marks omitted)). District Court held that 
Monell requires: 
The Plaintiff must prove all of the elements outlined previously and establish that 
the alleged unwritten policy be so "persistent and widespread" that it constitutes a 
"permanent and well settled ... policy". 
720) To be actionable, an unwritten policy or custom must so "persistent and widespread" 
that it constitutes a "permanent and well settled city policy." Monell, 436 at 691. "Liability 
for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded 
upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency that conduct has become a 
17 
not 
only convicted once." (R Court went on: 
charges brought against were clear malicious nnlse,::utmn 
cases, it most likely would not be enough to establish a persistent and widespread 
policy. However, the first charge was clearly not a malicious prosecution case 
because Plaintiff essentially stipulated that there was probable cause to charge her 
when she submitted her Alford plea. 
721) District properly held because there was no policy or custom 
to these Respondents to Monell liability. On appeal, Appellant has not made any 
that the District was findings. should affirm the 
Court's finding 
Office, Sheriff Olsen, and Commissioner Raymond. 
served 
B. APPELLANT IMPROPERLY REFERENCED MATERIALS NOT 
INCLUDED IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL, AND THIS COURT MUST 
IGNORE SUCH REFERENCES. 
Appellant has not made a single citation to any fact in the Record on Appeal. Appellant 
Brief on Respondents on April 1 2016, more than a month before the Record on 
"'L'v"u' was lodged with this Court-rendering it impossible for Appellant to cite to any portion 
of the Record on Appeal. This Court has held that "[i]t is the responsibility of the appellant to 
provide a sufficient record to substantiate his or her claims on appeal. the absence of an 
adequate record on appeal to support the appellant's claims, we will not presume error." Kugler 
18 
to on at 
Court should a 
on 
"Nature the Case" section Brief "Statement 
section of her 
Record on Appeal. 
section of her 
Brief (pgs. 19-27), and the "Brief Summary (32-33). None of 
purported facts comes a to 
example, Appellant's is a section beginning on page 33 
VL-L VHVvU a list none 
vH•~--~'U to the record to U~fJ,.,~A which exist in the Record on 
facts. addition, each item by Appellant her "Brief Summary has 
paraphrased and/or re-characterized by Appellant such as fashion as to render the "fact" 
completely unreliable. on the list Appellant asserts that "Plaintiff 
worked for years with the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office concerning animal welfare." This 
fact is categorically untrue. Appellant never "worked for" Jefferson County in any formal or 
~v .. ,~ ... was never an employee, contractor or volunteer Jefferson 
County. Instead, Appellant operates an animal humane society and goes about snooping over 
fences in Jefferson County reporting what Appellant and Appellant alone deems to be "animal 
concerns. As a result of these efforts Appellant has cited on three occasions for 
19 
at 
Court should ignore fact submitted Appellant 
to the on fact listed on pages 1 1 
Appellant's Brief should be excluded from consideration. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS TO ALL CLAIMS. 
While Appellant has not challenged other claims dismissed by the District 
a 
at 
summary judgment (neither has the Appellant challenged defenses relied upon by the District 
Court in dismissing Appellant's claims) the remaining claims were properly dismissed. 
example, in the Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment the District 
Court dismissed all of Appellants claims arising prior to September 16, 2012 on the basis that 
any such conduct was barred by the statute of limitations. (R. 707) Appellant has not appealed 
this legal ruling, and as such, it should be affirmed. This ruling is important because Appellant 
has argued before this Court (without citation to the record) various facts that occurred long 
before September 16, 2012. In her "Statement of Facts" section of her Brief, Appellant discusses 
the first two trespass citations, both which were resolved prior to 2011. See, Appellant's Brief, 
pgs. 19-21. These arguments ( and/or facts) were barred under the statute oflimitations, and 
should be disregarded by this Court. 
a not appealed 
as 
consider 
1 at at 204;("[Appellant's] arguments support 
record or in legal authority. Court will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not 
supported by propositions law, authority or argument. [internal quotation omitted] Therefore, 
this 
are not 
declines to review these arguments. 
Similarly, this should decline to review other arguments raised by Appellant that 
upon authority or factual references to Record on Appeal. 
APPELLANT DID NOT RAISE ANY ISSUE REGARDING DISCOVERY AT 
THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL. 
In part her "Issues Presented On Appeal", Appellant has questioned whether the 
District Court erred granting summary judgment "before Plaintiff had the opportunity to 
depose Defendants that had already been scheduled." See, Appellant's Brief, pg. 27. This Court 
has long held that "[ s ]ubstantive issues will not be considered for the first time on appeal. 
Woods, 150 Idaho at 244 P.3d at 201; (citing Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 51 181 
P.3d 435, 438 (2007)). Therefore, "[a] litigant may not remain silent as to claimed error during a 
trial and later urge his objections thereto for the first time on appeal." Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 
Idaho 33, 35, 644 355, 357 (1982). 
21 
to 
issuance of its ae<:1s1:on on Respondents' motion 
were remedies available to Appellant to ensure that she had an opportunity to 
to the ruling, and se litigants are 
to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." Twin Falls Cnty, 139 Idaho 
at 445, 80 P 3d at 1046. This Court should decline to review any discovery issues as they were 
not raised at the District Court level. 
V. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41, Respondents seek an award of attorney fees and 
costs in accordance with Idaho Code § 12-117 and/or Idaho Code § 6-918. Section 12-117 
provides for a municipal entity to recover attorney fees when "the party against whom the 
judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Section 6-918 provides for 
an award of costs and fees where the prevailing party demonstrates "by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the party against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of bad faith in 
the commencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the action." Idaho Code Ann.§ 6-918A 
(West). These sections provide that a County is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal 
inasmuch the appeal has been brought frivolously, in bad faith, and without foundation in fact or 
law. Case law has held that an appeal is deemed frivolous when a party fails to make a legitimate 
to on 
m commencement appeal in that has not submitted 
not a "legitimate showing" that 
law. Attorney's fees and costs on appeal are warranted. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that this Court affirm the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment dismissing Appellant's Complaint in its entirety, 
and grant an award attorney's fees and costs on appeal to Respondents. 
Dated this day of June, 2016. 
W. Elliott 
2498 2100 North 
Hamer, Idaho 83425 
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